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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate a form of soft paternalism put forth by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein known as libertarian paternalism.  On their view, 
criteria are provided for distinguishing between justified and unjustified libertarian 
paternalism policy proposals.  The central philosophical issue surrounding libertarian 
paternalism is determining when limitations on autonomy for the sake of beneficence are 
justified.  However, the criteria given by Thaler and Sunstein are inadequate because they 
do not effectively overcome problematic case examples.  I contend that an additional 
autonomy-based condition should be added to their criteria.  Specifically, autonomy may 
trump beneficence in favor of rejection of a policy if certain crucial autonomy 
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Introduction 
A growing body of literature in economics and law is challenging the notion that 
people are generally competent decision makers with regard to their own wellbeing. 
Failures in rationality at the level of judgments and choices are being systematically 
documented.  In response to this, there are optimistic perspectives, within both economics 
and philosophy, embracing the possibility that paternalist measures can counteract 
limitations on rationality and bring about welfare improvements in society.  The overall 
purpose of this thesis is to explore a form of soft paternalism, called libertarian 
paternalism, which has been the topic of many recent discussions on the direction of 
future public policy.  Libertarian paternalism has been popularized by a prominent 
economist Richard Thaler and a no less prominent legal scholar Cass Sunstein in their 
book, Nudge.  The specific aim of this thesis is to develop a way of distinguishing 
justified libertarian paternalist proposals from the unjustified ones in specific policy 
decisions by investigating two problematic case examples.  My view is that Thaler and 
Sunstein’s criteria are inadequate because they do not effectively overcome problematic 
case examples and that an additional condition should be added to their criteria.  The 
condition is that autonomy trumps beneficence to reject policies if certain crucial, but not 
all, autonomy considerations are violated.   
Thaler and Sunstein refer to their libertarian paternalist proposals as nudges.  The 
theory behind libertarian paternalism is similar to other contending theories by different 
authors including “asymmetric paternalism” (Camerer, et al., 2003) and “new 
interventionism” (Lowenstein & Ubel, 2008).  As defined by Thaler and Sunstein, a 
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nudge is “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” 
(Nudge, 6).  They classify their theory as libertarian paternalism because it attempts to 
unite a traditional economists’ commitment to consumer sovereignty and free markets 
with an element of institutional intervention.  They contend that a libertarian variety of 
paternalism is coherent, even though seemingly contradictory, because choices “are not 
blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened” (Nudge, 5).  Actually, their original, 
seminal article on the subject boasts about libertarian paternalism that it is “not an 
oxymoron” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003).  On their view, libertarian paternalism consists of 
interventions that are “easy and cheap to avoid” and that are never mandates (Nudge, 6).  
At the same time, however, libertarian paternalist interventions are designed to 
paternalistically “steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives” by the 
standards that they themselves would endorse through “self-conscious efforts” 
implemented by private and public institutions (Nudge, 5).   
Some examples of nudge policies are put forth by Thaler and Sunstein.  A 
commonly referenced example provided in the introduction of their book pertains to the 
arrangement of food choices in a school cafeteria.  In this example, a cafeteria director 
would arrange the food choices such that the healthy options are more frequently chosen 
over the unhealthy options.  The cafeteria director deliberately chooses the arrangement 
that will encourage students to choose the healthy options rather than an arrangement that 
is random, that encourages students to select the most popular food choices, or that 
maximizes profit.  In this way, the cafeteria director is nudging to encourage healthier 
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eating habits.  Another prototypical example of a nudge is called “Save More Tomorrow” 
which encourages employees to save more money for retirement via defined contribution 
plans through their employer.  When employees enroll in this program, they commit to 
allowing an automatic increase in their retirement contribution rate for every subsequent 
pay raise.  Employees are enrolled by default but they are not required to join the 
program and do not incur penalties for opting out.  Essentially, employees are nudged 
towards earmarking more of their earnings for retirement.  A third example of a nudge 
proposal is to increase organ donations by changing the standard (or default) rule from 
explicit consent (or opt-in) to either presumed consent (or opt-out) or mandated choice 
(everyone is required to make a choice one way or another).  Either way, making the 
change away from explicit consent would be a nudge towards saving the lives of many 
awaiting organ transplants. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into the following sections.  First, the 
concept of paternalism as well as the different types of paternalism will be explained in 
detail.   Second, the rationality findings from behavioral economics related to libertarian 
paternalism will be summarized.  Third, the general objections to libertarian paternalism 
will be discussed.  Fourth, the specific case problems of subliminal messages and the 
cocaine vaccine, which are of primary interest, will be described in detail.  Next, I will 
present the conditions which must be evaluated in order for a nudge to be justified and 
show how the specific problems facing libertarian paternalism can be overcome.  Last, 
this thesis will end with concluding remarks.    
Philosophical Issues
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The all-encompassing definition of paternalism is “the interference of a state or an 
individual with another person, against their will, and justified by a claim that the person 
interfered with will be better off or protected from harm” (Dworkin, 2005).  At this point, 
it will be helpful to more narrowly specify the sort of libertarian paternalism that nudge 
policies fall under.  To put the rest of this discussion in context, libertarian paternalism 
can be defined by reference to the standard distinctions in the philosophical literature on 
paternalism. 
Types of paternalism   
The first distinction is between hard and soft paternalism.  Hard paternalism 
allows for paternalistic acts that prevent a person from doing harm to themselves even if 
they are acting voluntarily and with full information about the negative consequences of 
their action (Dworkin, 2005).  On the other hand, soft paternalism only allows for 
intervention up to the point of determining “whether the person being interfered with is 
acting voluntarily and knowledgably” (Dworkin, 2005).  The classic case used to 
delineate soft paternalism from hard paternalism is Mill’s bad bridge example in which a 
person is about to walk across a damaged bridge. A soft paternalist would condone using 
force to stop the person from crossing the bridge to find out whether they know the 
condition of the bridge.  Beyond that, a soft paternalist may not stop the person from 
crossing, for instance, if he knows the condition yet willingly chooses to cross and risk 
his life.  Conversely, a hard paternalist would condone stopping the person against their 
will even after they are informed about the condition of the bridge.  As for nudges, they 
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are classified soft paternalism because they do not eliminate the option for an individual 
to make a determined choice even if it is not in their own self-interest.  
The second distinction is between broad and narrow paternalism.  Broad 
paternalism is concerned with paternalistic acts by any individual, group, or institution 
(Dworkin, 2005).  Narrow paternalism is only concerned “with the question of coercion 
by the state” (Dworkin, 2005).  Even though Thaler and Sunstein maintain that nudges 
are desirable and advantageous in the private sector, their objective is to justify nudges in 
the public sector.  For the purposes of this thesis, nudges will be defined as narrow 
because the issues being debated only deal with governmental policy implications.  
However, in other applications, nudges could be considered broad because they are 
intended to have usefulness in the private sector as well.  The third distinction is between 
weak and strong paternalism.  Weak paternalism states that “it is legitimate to interfere 
with the means that agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely to 
defeat those ends” (Dworkin, 2005).   Strong paternalism states that it is legitimate to 
include instances of interference when the ends themselves are determined to be mistaken 
or irrational (Dworkin, 2005).  Nudges could be considered either weak or strong 
paternalism.  For example, if people truly prefer to eat well then it is legitimate, on the 
weak view, to rearrange food in a cafeteria setting in such a way that the healthier options 
are more frequently chosen.  In this scenario, a nudges are weak because they only 
interfere with the means that people use to make choices while preserving their end value 
of eating healthy.  On the other hand, nudges could be considered strong paternalism 
because they attempt to modify other people’s mistaken preferences by way of 
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persuasively offering different alternatives.  As in the same cafeteria example, 
rearranging food options for people that truly prefer to eat poorly would be an attempt to 
interfere with their end value of eating unhealthy by encouraging the exact opposite.  In 
this sense, nudges are strong because they seek to change values for what are considered 
mistaken ends (i.e. eating unhealthy).   
The fourth distinction is between pure and impure paternalism.  Pure paternalism 
would be imposing interventions on the same group that is being protected or helped 
(Dworkin, 2005).  Impure paternalism would be imposing interventions on a group for 
the sake of protecting or helping an entirely different group (Dworkin, 2005).  Nudges are 
pure because they target the same group that is being protected or helped.  For instance, 
the Save More Tomorrow program is directed towards individuals that want to save more 
money for themselves in retirement.  At first glance, many nudges, particularly ones with 
default-rules, may seem as if they are targeting larger audiences than they are protecting 
because nudges are typically wide ranging and have large-scale application such as those 
that utilize clever ad campaigns (i.e. “Don’t mess with Texas”).  But, nudges are non-
mandatory so anyone that doesn’t want to be subjected to intervention can decline to 
participate or opt-out.  So, nudges are not impure in that there are no required 
interventions imposed on certain people for the sake of helping entirely different people.    
The fifth distinction is between moral and welfare paternalism.  Moral paternalism is the 
view that the purpose of intervention is to protect people against moral corruption 
(Dworkin, 2005).  Welfare paternalism is the view that the purpose of intervention is to 
make people’s lives go better (Dworkin, 2005).  There is no agenda to promote the 
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“moral wellbeing” of society in nudge policies; thus, they are welfare-based.   In 
summary, libertarian paternalism falls into some of the comparatively benign distinctions 
of paternalism.  Now, we can shift our discussion to concern about when we should be 
justified in implementing nudges. 
Autonomy and beneficence 
 The basic philosophical tension surrounding paternalism taken as a whole hinges 
on concerns about when limitations on freedom or autonomy are justified.  There have 
been numerous discussions attempting to set apart exactly “when a paternalistically 
motivated social policy or individual action interfering with persons for their own good 
and without their consent is justified” (Brock, 1988).  More directly, paternalism must 
confront the two conflicting aims of preserving individual autonomy while at the same 
time promoting beneficence.  One widely accepted view of paternalism is that autonomy 
must always trump beneficence when there is a conflict between the two (Feinberg, 1986; 
VanDeVeer, 1986; Glover, 1977; Arneson, 1980).  This stance rules out hard paternalism 
and is taken by those who want to “avoid an unwarranted endorsement of excessive 
paternalism” (Brock, 1988).  The opposite view in which beneficence should trump 
autonomy when there is a conflict between the two could also be argued.  This stance is 
taken by those who believe that paternalistic intervention is needed in order to help 
people make decisions that are in their best interest.  It permits hard paternalism which 
would allow interventions against people’s will by using deception, coercion, and 
violations of autonomy (Scoccia, 2008).  Yet another view is a middle option between the 
opposing views and it is called the balancing view (Brock, 1983; Brock, 1988;  Dworkin, 
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1971).  The balancing view puts forth the commonsense notion that there need not be an 
overarching commitment to autonomy or beneficence in all cases whenever there is 
conflict.  Rather, these values must be weighted and chosen on a case-by-case basis.  
Sometimes, we may determine that a person’s wellbeing takes precedence over their 
autonomy; yet, at other times, we may determine that their autonomy takes precedence 
over their wellbeing. 
In this thesis, it will be argued that paternalism is legitimate in some, although not 
all, cases.  In particular, I find the balancing view based on commonsense to be 
compelling because in the public policy process, proposals are evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.  However, the practical difficulty is whether we can distinguish the exact 
conditions in which soft paternalism is justified.  This thesis will explore two test cases 
classified as libertarian paternalistic policies and determine whether they promote 
beneficence while at the same time preserving autonomy.  I will argue that a legitimate 
nudge needs to pass evaluation for an additional condition beyond what is included in 
Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria.  In many nudge proposals, beneficence considerations 
justifiably outweigh small, minor infringements of autonomy.  The condition needed to 
rule out some more problematic test cases is that autonomy trumps beneficence to reject 
policies if crucial autonomy considerations are violated, where crucial is understood as 
not excessively curtailing self-direction, upholding negative obligations to respect 
individuals, and including interventions that individuals would choose if and only if they 
were fully rational and well-informed.   
Types of error in implementation 
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Unfortunately, public policy is not perfect and there may be cause for concern that 
the government may make mistakes when deliberating about possible proposals.  As for 
libertarian paternalism proposals, a good policy would be one that both helps people and 
at the same time is not too paternalistic- it achieves the right balance between beneficence 
and autonomy.  A bad policy would be one that neglects to help people or that is too 
paternalistic- it does not attain the right balance of beneficence and autonomy.  In an 
ideal world, we want to accept only the good policies and reject only the bad ones.  
Realistically, though, it’s helpful to explore what happens when we are faced with error 
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Implementation of libertarian paternalism can result in two different types of bad, 
or erroneous, outcomes.  The first type of error is classified as a false positive in which 
we reject implementing policies even though they would have turned out to be good.  The 
second type of error is classified as a false negative in which we implement policies even 
though they turn out to be bad.  Surely, while both types of errors are to be avoided when 
creating and deliberating about specific proposals, it is a task that is easier said than done.  
The supposed goals of public policy are multi-faceted and can include various competing 
values such as promoting welfare, upholding autonomy, maintaining justice, maximizing 
Catalano, Michelle E., 2010, UMSL, p. 12 
capabilities, etc. and it is challenging to uphold one at a time much less many of them 
simultaneously.  In clarifying this issue, it helps to narrow down the two main goals for 
libertarian paternalist policies in question: promoting beneficence and upholding 
autonomy.      
Error in implementation of policies can be likened to the discussion of trading off 
beneficence and autonomy.  If the government adopts a view that autonomy should trump 
beneficence in all cases where they conflict, then it is analogous to cases where we reject 
policies that would have turned out to be good.  The policy would have been helpful and 
it wouldn’t have been too paternalistic if it hadn’t been rejected.  This autonomy-
trumping stance is just the same as committing a false positive error.  If the government 
adopts a view that beneficence should trump autonomy in all cases where they conflict, 
then it is analogous to cases where we accept policies that turn out to be bad.   The policy 
would have been helpful but only at the expense of being too paternalistic.  This 
beneficence-trumping stance is just the same as committing a false negative error.  At the 
public policy level, the optimal solution would be to balance between the autonomy-
trumping stance and the beneficence-trumping stance depending on the situation rather 
than only adhering to one or the other.  To reduce the possibility for erroneous outcomes 
in implementation, it’s helpful to more closely analyze the source of error.  The 
difference between good and bad proposals is not whether we should help people– all 
libertarian paternalist proposals contain a beneficent element.  The difference between 
good and bad proposals is in the distinction of whether it is “too paternalist.”  This means 
the important task is to figure out which proposals begin to create unjustifiable 
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infringements on autonomy.  On my view, there are limits on the extent to which 
infringements of autonomy should be allowed.  Later in this thesis, I will return to the 
topic of balancing beneficence and autonomy after the problems of libertarian 
paternalism will be discussed.  Before that, in the next section, the rationality findings 
related to libertarian paternalism will be presented.  This will provide the underpinnings 
for why libertarian paternalist measures should be considered in the first place and why 
promoting beneficence is important.  
Rationality Findings Related to Libertarian Paternalism 
 The primary motivation for supporters of libertarian paternalism comes from 
recent findings in behavioral economics on rationality.  The findings in behavioral 
economics indicate that “people do not appear to do what is best for themselves” 
(Loewenstein & Ubel, 2008).  Basically, individuals often fail to maximize their own 
long-term welfare.  Although it was historically assumed that agents always act in 
accordance with rational self-interest, there has been an increasing tendency to assume 
that many psychological flaws in our human nature hinder us and prevent us from being 
rational.  In particular, economic theory has traditionally assumed that agents have well-
defined stable preferences, that they are adept at judging probabilities and can faultlessly 
integrate their preferences and beliefs by maximizing their utility.  This traditional view 
has been replaced by the work of behavioral economists that has taken place over the past 
few decades. 
A foundational perspective which can be traced back to early behavioral 
economics is called bounded rationality (Simon, 1955).  Bounded rationality argues that 
Catalano, Michelle E., 2010, UMSL, p. 14 
people face limitations on making optimal, rational choices and, as a result, often make 
poor choices.  It is the starting point for many experimental examples exhibiting flaws in 
decision making that take place at the intersection of psychology and economics.  With 
these findings, Thaler and Sunstein demonstrate situations where individuals fail to act 
rationally and by doing this they motivate the need for their policy proposals.  They are 
not the first considering there is a move in economics to become “increasingly 
interventionist, stimulated in part by advances in behavioral economics” (Loewenstein & 
Ubel, 2008; Camerer, et al., 2003; Layard 2005; Frank, 1985; Goodin, 1991).  It is 
important to note, however, that behavioral economics does not abandon the neoclassical 
approach to economics “based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency” 
(Camerer & Loewenstein, 2002).  Rather, the appeal of behavioral economics is to 
improve economics by “generating theoretical insights, making better predictions of field 
phenomena, and suggesting better policy” (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2002).  So, the same 
basic economic framework is being advanced by taking limits on rationality into account. 
The prevalence of bounded rationality has been supported by a great deal research 
in behavioral economics.  Some of the earlier experimental examples in the field 
generated “prospect theory” which was proposed as an alternative to expected utility 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  Expected utility 
theory assumes that individuals always make accurate choices when confronted with 
uncertain options concerning gains and losses simply by calculating probabilities and 
combining them with utility values based on stable context-independent preferences. 
Under expected utility theory, it is assumed that individuals will choose the option that 
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results in the highest utility, which is thought to be the option that is best for them.  In 
opposition to this, prospect theory exhibits the fact that individuals, in reality, are not 
very accurate at the kinds of choices involved with uncertainty.  Instead, individuals are 
highly sensitive to gains and losses when they are presented from different, even 
arbitrary, reference points.  Under prospect theory, individuals do not choose the best 
option because they have been unduly influenced by other things besides mere utility and 
probability such as situational factors.  An overwhelming amount of experimentation in 
various areas suggests that erroneous decision-making is the result of ill-conceived 
judgments, ill-defined choices, as well as other considerations involving risk, such as 
reference dependence.  The research in each of these areas will be elaborated in turn. 
Ill-conceived judgments 
In behavioral economics, it is not assumed that individuals always accurately 
adjust judgment in light of changes in the likeliness of an outcome.  In fact, there are 
many examples to the contrary depicting instances of poor probability judgment.  The 
first examples fall under the classification of different “heuristic mechanisms” which lead 
people to make judgments that do not conform to true probabilities (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002).  The most well known is the “availability heuristic” which explains that 
people make predictions based on how easy it is to recall past events or imagine future 
events (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  Heuristics contribute to other biases such as the 
“hindsight bias” which is overestimating probabilities that were attached to events in the 
past and the “curse of knowledge” which is the tendency to “find it hard to imagine how 
little others know” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Camerer & Loewenstein, 2002).  In 
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addition, heuristics play a role in employing mental shortcuts as in “representativeness” 
wherein we overestimate occurrences of stereotypes within a particular class type 
(Kahneman, 2002; Camerer & Loewenstein, 2002).  In other words, we tend to 
overestimate occurrences of patterns.  Ill-conceived judgments also come in the form of 
“confirmation bias” which is the tendency to correctly attribute evidence in support of a 
belief while at the same time mistakenly attributing counter-evidence to that same belief 
(Rabin & Schrag, 1999).  Other instances of self-serving motivations are evident, such as 
“wishful thinking,” in which we subjectively assign a higher likeliness to outcomes that 
are favorable to ourselves (Babock & Loewenstein, 1997).  
Ill-defined choices 
In behavioral economics, it is not assumed that individuals have perfectly defined 
preferences.  There are numerous examples showing that the choices individuals make 
are the result of ill-defined preferences.  One common example is “framing effects” in 
which actual choices are influenced by the way choice options are presented (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  Another example is “anchoring” in which we make quantity choices 
based on adjustment to another quantity that we confidently know (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  The problem stems from the fact that the anchored quantity 
frequently results in an inadequate adjustment when the anchor is arbitrarily low or high.  
Depending on the method used to present choices, individuals can even experience 
“preference reversals” manifested when the way choices are presented evokes opposite 
choices when given a comparison between two items (Grether & Plott, 1979).  Moreover, 
when we have to make a choice out of a group of options, our preference is influenced by 
Catalano, Michelle E., 2010, UMSL, p. 17 
the other options included the group; this is called “context effect” (Huber, Payne & Puto, 
1982). 
Other risk situations 
Examples of bounded rationality have been discovered within several other 
spheres relating to our current situation, past consumption, and tolerance for risk.  
“Reference dependence” shows that people have exaggerated preferences for objects that 
have been given to them or that are relative to other mechanisms that influence choice 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Knetsch, 1992; Kahneman, 2002).  Reference dependence 
is exhibited when people are faced with a choice between two or more options in which 
their differences are drastically drawn out.  When presented with the drastically differing 
options, people will often make choices based on what appears more attractive only in 
relation to the other option(s).  Closely related to this is the “endowment effect” in which 
people assign a higher value to objects that were recently given to them, in terms of 
willingness to sell, than people who do not have the same endowment merely because of 
their ownership (Kahneman et al, 1990).  Both reference dependence and the endowment 
effect are manifestations of “loss aversion” which is essentially the notion that people 
would rather avoid losses then obtain gains (Kahneman, 2002).  Other examples include 
“mental accounting” which occurs when people assign separate mental accounts to divide 
money for various purposes even though money does not technically have to be 
controlled in this way (Thaler, 1980; Thaler, 1999).  An “immediacy effect” is 
demonstrated when individuals who are normally willing to forego larger, future financial 
rewards for immediate rewards that result in immediate consumption switch their 
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preferences to the future financial rewards when both rewards are delayed (Prelec & 
Loewsenstein, 1991).  This shows that individuals have an irrational penchant for 
immediate consumption.  Next, “magnitude effects” describe situations where people 
dislike delays in consumption more than they like speeding up consumption 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Lowenstein, 1988).  In addition, even something as simple 
as emotions, depending on the situation, can inadvertently influence decisions by making 
us focus on short-term rather than long-term benefits (Romer, 2000).   
Bounded rationality as a reason to support nudges 
Sunstein & Thaler provide many of the aforementioned examples of bounded 
rationality as reasons for why libertarian paternalist government intervention is justified.  
In their book, they phrase the employment of clever designs as “choice architecture” that 
take bounded rationality into account and that nudge us towards decisions that will make 
us better off.  Some of the examples from behavioral economics discussed above that are 
outlined by Sunstein and Thaler include the availability heuristic, representativeness, 
framing, anchoring, loss aversion, and mental accounting.  They also offer some other 
examples not yet discussed such as instances where we use faulty rules of thumb or 
mental shortcuts in instead of accurate analysis, when we have overconfidence and fail to 
plan for likely risks, and when we permit status quo biases in which current inertia or 
laziness prevent us from taking action.   Sunstein and Thaler also put forth that we have 
many temptations that lead us towards mindless choosing and a basic inability to exercise 
self-control.  Moreover, we have a tendency to just “follow the herd” and act in 
accordance with what others around us are doing.  We worry too much about what people 
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think about us, especially in potentially embarrassing circumstances which is the 
“spotlight effect,” and we are susceptible to stimulus that “primes” us towards certain 
behavior by persuasively gearing us up and dismantling any preventative barriers.  
Because of these factors, they claim, we are in a position where nudges are desirable for 
us because they significantly improve our wellbeing in the areas of health, wealth, and 
happiness where our society is besieged.  (Nudge, Chapters 1-3) 
 The findings from behavioral economics show many instances in which we are 
not making decisions that are in our own long-term best interest and in which 
intervention can counterbalance our natural tendencies and improve our ability to make 
good decisions.  However, the prevalence of bounded rationality should not automatically 
suggest support for unwarranted paternalism; we should still exercise caution and be 
concerned with providing proper justification for intervention.  After all, there may be 
cases in which mass education programs are better justified then nudges.   There is still 
more work to be done in determining when interventionist methods are appropriate, 
selecting the degree at which paternalism becomes too coercive, and finding the proper 
balance for various goals of public policy.  Thaler and Sunstein would agree about the 
need for careful consideration in implementation but would eagerly defend their policies 
by maintaining that the libertarian element is sufficient to withstand the threat over-
intervention.  They claim the libertarian element would preserve freedom of choice and 
allow individuals to pursue and satisfy their own desires.  Although, it is debatable 
whether the criteria they provide is satisfactory for actual policy application.  In the next 
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section, I will introduce some of the general types of objections to libertarian paternalism 
and differentiate which is of most importance. 
General Problems of Libertarian Paternalism 
 Although the insights from behavioral economics seem warranted and quite 
persuasive, it is important to investigate the problems of the interventionist position.  
There are three main criticisms of libertarian paternalism.  First, some critics object by 
claiming that libertarian paternalism is not paternalistic enough.  Second, some critics 
object by claiming that libertarian paternalism is not libertarian enough.  Third, some 
critics argue that libertarian paternalism has weaknesses in its application and the 
problematic cases that it might allow.  This problem also looks at the extent to which 
unjustified libertarian paternalism needs to be guarded against.  Now, we will explore the 
three criticisms in depth.  
Too paternalist 
The first possible problem with libertarian paternalism is that it is too paternalist.  
This manifests itself in several different forms but the most general position is held by 
extreme libertarians.  Basically, the position maintains that interventionism at any cost is 
too costly and any coerciveness is and too coercive.  Stated another way, individuals 
ought to be left alone and allowed to make decisions that make them worse off and that 
the government should not encourage or intervene one way or another.  Moreover, as 
Thaler and Sunstein point out, libertarian paternalism can slide down a slippery slope to 
harder forms of paternalism.  The slippery slope argument implies that the government 
will implement policies that are increasingly more and more paternalist as time goes on 
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even if we begin with modest policies.   The concern is that there will be no stopping the 
government from overstepping and sliding all the way down the slope to aggressive 
policies.  (Nudge, pg 239-241; Glaeser, 2006) They acknowledge and respond to this 
objection by making three refutations.  First, they say that the slippery slope argument 
“ducks the question of whether …proposals have merit in and of themselves” (Nudge, pg 
240).  Second, they say that their construction of the definition of the libertarian 
paternalism has a built in response to the slippery slope argument.  Namely, the 
libertarian element of it is enough to guard against the possibility that policies will 
become too paternalistic.  Third, they say that sometimes it is necessary for the 
government to make a choice one way or another as part of choice architecture for new 
programs and, all things considered, nudges that steer people towards making the 
decisions that will make them better off is preferable to the alternative of doing the 
opposite or nothing at all.  However, Thaler and Sunstein themselves admit hesitation in 
that “deciding where to stop, and when to call a nudge a shove…, is tricky” (Nudge, pg 
254). 
Another possible formulation of this general objection is made by Edward 
Glaeser.  Glaeser takes the slippery slope argument further and makes an interesting case 
against libertarian paternalism by saying that it is more dangerous than hard paternalism 
(Glaeser, 2006).  Glaeser classifies the aforementioned behavioral economics research as 
situationalism in which erroneous decision-making characterized by our limited ability to 
reason, our reliance on short-term wellbeing, and context dependence ultimately results 
in long-term wellbeing being compromised (Glaeser, 2003).  He calls these instances of 
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situationalism because decisions are made based on isolated or localized situations 
without regard for the long-term.  He brings up many other real-world examples that 
exhibit the fact that individuals are extremely subject to social influence and tend to make 
erroneous decisions.  (Glaeser, 2006)  For instance, some specific examples described in 
detail by Glaeser include false advertising, belief manipulation in the form of 
indoctrination in schools in certain countries, and media techniques used solely for belief 
formation.  He uses these examples to show that while traditional welfare economics is in 
need of reform this should not necessarily be taken as an argument for more government 
intervention.  Glaeser builds his case on grounds that are counter to what we might 
intuitively think about soft paternalism which is that the government is potentially the 
solution to the problem of bounded rationality at the individual level.  He claims that both 
individuals and governments are bad at making decisions and exhibit bounded rationality 
but that governments are even worse at decision-making than individuals.  Furthermore, 
once governments start implementing soft paternalism, they have a strong incentive to 
conceal and then abuse their power.  
I reject the extreme libertarian objection because many policies hold great 
promise to increase societal wellbeing.   The benefits should not be dismissed merely 
from the threat that the government will poorly execute policies.   In actuality, there are 
many successful examples of soft paternalist policy implementation that are widely 
accepted as both desirable and prudent.  I also accept the characterization against strict 
anti-paternalism that it ignores distributive dimensions of fairness (Arneson, 1989).  
Restricting all paternalism “in effect gives to the haves and takes from the have-nots” 
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because “more able agents are more likely to do better for themselves choosing among an 
unrestricted range of options whereas less able agents are more likely to opt for a bad 
option that would have been removed from the choice set” (Arneson, 1989).  In terms of 
one of the various goals of government, some acts of paternalism are warranted in 
principled support of fairness for the less advantaged. 
Too libertarian  
The second purported problem with libertarian paternalism is that it is too 
libertarian.  This main position is held by extreme paternalists.  It relies on the 
assumption that individuals experience crippling bounded rationality and are unable to 
make optimal choices without assistance.  Essentially, the goal is to protect people from 
making bad choices at any cost or with any coercive measure because freedom of choice 
is not a priority.  While wholesale endorsement of strict paternalism is not common, there 
are some views that can be construed as having much more paternalist ambitions than 
libertarian paternalism.  Some perfectionist political views that rely heavily on objective 
accounts of wellbeing potentially warrant higher levels of paternalistic interference 
(Arneson, 2000).  There are also lines of reasoning which would give support for taxes, 
bans, and laws on behaviors deemed undesirable for society.  Thaler and Sunstein briefly 
address this general objection to libertarian paternalism and dismiss it because taxes, 
bans, and laws imply high costs to society (Nudge, 252).  They only support policies that 
fall within the threshold of “low costs.”  This is also the threshold offered by asymmetric 
paternalists in which the actual costs and benefits of a policy are weighed.  For the 
asymmetric paternalists, the benefits to the least sophisticated much be large and the costs 
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to the most sophisticated must be small (Camerer, et al., 2003).  The least sophisticated 
group includes those who frequently make errors and the most sophisticated group 
includes those who are fully rational (Camerer, et al., 2003)  For example, allowable 
impositions would include mandatory waiting periods before a couple may get divorced 
or “cooling off-periods” after making a purchase from a door-to-door salesman.  
Although, going further, neither asymmetric paternalists nor libertarian paternalists 
would give support to, for instance, bans even in the areas of safety, health, or consumer 
protection.  In the paternalist line of reasoning, though, there are some who do give 
justification for these types of bans (Frank, 1985).  Moreover, some strict paternalists 
would give justification for even more measures that restrict freedom of choice in cases 
where, it has been argued, beneficence trumps autonomy (Brock, 1988).  For example, 
one stance that has been put forth is the imposition of a “corrective tax” on income to the 
point where people are deterred from seeking a higher relative income level; this tax is 
suggested in light of research showing that increases in relative income past a certain 
point do not contribute to happiness (Layard, 2005). 
I reject the extreme paternalist objection to libertarian paternalism because 
government should be cautious about implementing policies that restrict autonomy.  At 
the least, preservation of autonomy stands as a barrier to unchecked paternalism 
(Feinberg, 1986) or oppression.  A basic conception of autonomy in which people are 
minimally responsible for their decisions and are able to speak for themselves 
(Christman, 2009) should be upheld as one of the varied goals of government.  
Furthermore, a basic conception of freedom of choice in which people have consumption 
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options should be upheld as one of the varied goals of an economy.  As previously 
discussed, a widely held position in the paternalism literature is that autonomy should 
always trump beneficence when the two notions are in conflict.  I am not defending that 
strong of a view; I am only defending the intuition behind it that sometimes autonomy 
must trump beneficence in order to achieve a proper balance between the two notions.  In 
sum, strict paternalism should be dismissed to avoid the infringement of crucial 
autonomy conditions. 
Criteria are not adequate 
The third and a more compelling problem with libertarian paternalism is that 
Thaler and Sunstein attempt but fail to make an adequately clear criterion by which to 
judge exactly which proposals are desirable yet not too paternalistic.  They offer the basic 
theoretical underpinnings for policy proposals but there is still much debate about what 
might and might not be allowed and considered as a nudge.  In general, we want to 
respect people’s freedom of choice unless we have reasons to believe otherwise that 
intervention is preferable but that does not tell us exactly where to draw the line.  
Drawing the precise distinction between which policies are justifiable and which are not 
justifiable would be helpful for determining the restrictions on the theory and also 
helpful, obviously, for the purpose of public policy implementation.  There are other 
practical concerns that go along with this problem.  First, government planners could do a 
bad job in the implementation acting as “evil nudgers” as Thaler and Sunstein suggest.  
They respond by saying that there should be monitoring of nudge-makers, that planners 
should be well-informed, and that people should still have freedom to choose alternatives.  
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Second, some critics contend that government should remain neutral on issues without 
swaying opinions one way or another.  Thaler and Sunstein respond by saying that it is 
impossible for government to be neutral on some decisions.  Even still, the problem of 
finding the exact limits of libertarian paternalism remains.   
Overall, Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria are inadequate.  Portions of their book are 
devoted to how nudges can be implemented and to describing examples of nudges but not 
enough addresses the detailed conditions that make a nudge justifiable.  Beyond meeting 
the requirements of being both libertarian and paternalist as they define those terms, 
Thaler and Sunstein give one “golden rule” for implementation of nudges which is the 
following: “offer nudges that are most likely to help and least likely to inflict harm” 
(Nudge, pg 74). They expand slightly by saying “people will need nudges for decisions 
that are difficult or rare, for which they do not get prompt feedback, and when they can 
easily understand” (Nudge, pg 74).  So, although Thaler and Sunstein give a very 
intuitive, commonsensical rationale for deciding when to implement nudges, I disagree 
that it is specific enough to rule out problematic cases and error in implementation at the 
public policy level where decision-making must be methodical, well-defined, and 
designed to reduce error.   
In sum, rather than focusing on the two extreme objections to libertarian 
paternalism, the more interesting and practical debate resides in the middle determining 
where limitations on autonomy are justified.  While careful examination of policies 
should take place at the policy level anyway, I contend that it depends whether we 
prioritize beneficence or autonomy.  Libertarian paternalism is legitimate in some cases 
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when the proper balance between autonomy and beneficence is achieved.  The most 
practical and fruitful exercise is to explore whether we can distinguish what precisely 
makes libertarian paternalist proposals justifiable.  There are crucial autonomy 
considerations that should trump beneficence in some certain cases.  Numerous problem 
cases can be imagined but the next two sections will present two challenging cases that 
reside in the middle-ground of whether or not they fall within the criteria of justified 
libertarian paternalist policies. 
The Problem of Subliminal Messages 
 One problematic case for libertarian paternalism that will be discussed is 
subliminal messages.  It is problematic because it serves as a test for determining whether 
the criterion for judging libertarian paternalist policies is adequate.  In this context, 
subliminal messages are a hypothetical example of an extremely discreet mechanism the 
government could use to influence people to make decisions that will improve their 
wellbeing.  The problem stems from the fact that, as defined, libertarian paternalism 
allows for the use of subliminal messages.  This is because libertarian paternalism allows 
for interferences in which people may not be aware of the mechanisms used to influence 
their decision-making, which is an essential feature of subliminal messages.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, a subliminal message will be communication that is transmitted 
via means that are not discernable to the recipient and that influence behavior 
accordingly.  Some simple examples of subliminal messages of the kind in question that 
challenge what should be considered libertarian paternalism include strategically placed 
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images on TV of happy people eating their vegetables or frequency wave announcements 
reminding people to brush their teeth (Bovens, 2008; Hausman & Welch, 2009). 
Neither subliminal messages nor libertarian paternalism “rule out alternatives or 
make them more costly” (Hausman & Welch, 2009).  Subliminal messages don’t rule out 
alternatives because they are among deceptions that only “make it appear to the 
individual that the choice set has changed” (Hausman & Welch, 2009).  At worst, they 
only make some alternatives much more difficult to choose but not impossible to choose.  
To imagine, every time we see the strategically placed subliminal commercial depicting a 
family joyfully devouring their steamed asparagus, we may have the urge to do the same 
although we still may not make that choice for various reasons.  We may have an iron-
clad will of resistance, we may recognize and ponder the subliminal nature of the 
commercial and choose to overcome its message, or we may be too lazy to make the 
choice even though it feels pressing or urgent, and so on.  Additionally, subliminal 
messages don’t make alternatives more costly because they are inexpensive yet effective.  
Even an amateur on a shoestring budget could film a 30 second commercial in an 
ordinary setting depicting a family with a voracious appetite for asparagus; plus, we 
could imagine that the television stations would “donate” allotted time to the government.  
Even still, on the face of it, subliminal message nudges could be objectionable because 
they “interfere with… preference formation” (Bovens, 2008) when the public is not 
aware of it.  More importantly, subliminal message nudges are objectionable because we 
cannot opt-out of receiving the messages in instances when the government leads us 
towards a choice we wouldn’t have otherwise made (i.e. heartily eating asparagus).  
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 Thaler and Sunstein attempt to confront the problem of subliminal messages by 
appealing to the publicity condition put forth by John Rawls which states that principles 
be known and understood by the public (Rawls, 1971).  Thaler and Sunstein interpret this 
as meaning any policies must be publicly defensible by the government (Nudge, pg 247). 
They suggest that the publicity condition be imposed to rule out the possibility of 
subliminal messages because the government would be unwilling to publicly defend their 
use of them.  But, their response is inadequate because “the government might be able 
and willing to defend the use of subliminal messages… to satisfy the publicity condition” 
(Hausman & Welch, 2009).   One possible solution that has been suggested to protect 
against potential infringements of freedom is to make a requirement that the government 
actually informs the public of its messages, not whether it is merely able and willing to 
inform the public (Hausman & Welch, 2009).  This could be done in a printed register of 
some sort where all subliminal messages are reported and disclosed.  This raises another 
issue about subliminal messages wherein their effectiveness depends on secrecy and 
allowing the government to secretly broadcast subliminal messages leading to a slippery 
slope.  In order to allay these concerns, it has been suggested that the public should be 
able to reasonably uncover every instance of a nudge even though that may make them 
less effective (Bovens, 2008). 
Thaler and Sunstein admit that subliminal messages are objectionable on the 
grounds they are impossible for individuals to monitor (Nudge, 249).  Even still, they 
cannot rule out subliminal messages because they do not represent a violation of their 
criteria for infringement on freedom which is only that policies must not rule out 
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alternatives or make them more costly (Hausman & Welch, 2009).  This qualifies 
subliminal messages as nudges because there is nothing to rule them out on Thaler and 
Sunstein’s view.  Yet, the point stands that subliminal messages infringe on freedom in 
other ways by curtailing self-direction and by not showing respect for individuals.  First, 
subliminal messages curtail self-direction because it is not clear how one could easily 
decline to accept subliminal messages in the same way that it is easy to decline enrolling 
a program such as Save More Tomorrow.  Even if we were informed about the subliminal 
messages, we do not possess the means to turn off the continuous bombardment if we 
want to.  Second, subliminal messages also do not show respect for individuals because 
people are inadequately informed about the reasons they are making their choices.  This 
violates negative constraints on obligations to individuals to not “interfere with their 
efforts to make their own decisions and govern their own conduct” (Dillon, 2010).  The 
more outright but similar example of a person being brainwashed is the classic case of a 
person who exhibits non-autonomous behavior.  As is the case with brainwashing, a 
person’s “rational faculties have played little… role in the formation of the preference” 
(Scoccia, 1990) with subliminal messages.  Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria for a nudge are 
inadequate because it allows subliminal messages and it is my view that they should be 
avoided because they represent crucial infringements on autonomy.    
The Problem of the Cocaine Vaccine 
 Another problematic case for libertarian paternalism that will be discussed is the 
cocaine vaccine.  Similar to subliminal messages, it serves as a test for whether the 
criterion for judging libertarian paternalist policies is adequate.  Interestingly, there has 
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been recent pharmaceutical research developing and investigating the plausibility of such 
a drug (Fox, 1997; Cohen, 1997; Johnson et al, 2000; Kantak, 2003).  So, it is probable 
that there may realistically be future policy discussion on this topic.  Now, in this context, 
the cocaine vaccine will represent a hypothetical proposal that could be implemented by 
the government to help people make a choice that will improve their wellbeing.  The 
cocaine vaccine would be “administered by injection… and remain in the bloodstream for 
an extended time” during which an anti-cocaine agent “renders cocaine both harmless 
and useless” in the body (Stevenson, 2005).   
The cocaine vaccine could have several different applications.  For instance, it 
could be administered to parolees, to welfare recipients, as a universal vaccination, or as 
a condition for certain types of employment (Stevenson, 2005).  On the face it, requiring 
a cocaine vaccine for any purpose seems like a blatant violation of the libertarian 
commitment to not restrict freedom of choice.  Upon closer inspection, we can easily 
imagine versions of the aforementioned cases that allow for freedom of choice to be 
maintained.  First, the cocaine vaccine could be administered to parolees with drug 
charges as an option in exchange for reduced penalties or to welfare recipients as an 
option in exchange for increased benefits.   Second, the cocaine vaccine could be 
administered to individuals who choose to elect themselves as recipients for preventive 
reasons.  This might apply to individuals who know they have a tendency or past history 
to use cocaine but who wish to permanently overcome the temptation.  Third, the cocaine 
vaccine could be administered universally by default with other childhood vaccinations 
unless an option to opt-out is exercised.  Fourth, the cocaine vaccine could be required 
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for certain jobs where employees could potentially harm others as in airplane pilots, bus 
drivers, heavy machine operators, etc.  In this case, individuals still have the option to 
pursue another job if they are opposed to the vaccination.   
Thaler and Sunstein do not address the hypothetical case of the cocaine vaccine 
but it represents an interesting and useful application example for libertarian paternalism.  
The situation where individuals elect themselves for the cocaine vaccine, as in the second 
example outlined above, is similar to the real-life example of self-bans on gambling 
which Thaler and Sunstein do endorse.  In the gambling self-ban, gambling addicts can 
choose to put themselves on a list that forbids them from entering a casino (Nudge, 235).   
They claim “self-bans are a great idea and suggest that research be done to explore ways 
to use this concept in other domains” (Nudge, 235).  The central question is whether the 
cocaine vaccine violates the nudge criteria for infringement on freedom which is that 
policies must not rule out alternatives or make them more costly.   Electing to choose a 
cocaine vaccine does not appear to rule out alternatives if one freely chooses to have the 
vaccination and apparently does not impose any costs (assuming that the development 
and implementation costs would be as non-prohibitive as other vaccines).  But, even 
when people freely choose to rule out alternatives, they are in fact reducing their choice 
set.  Strictly by their own definition, Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria do in fact disallow 
both the gambling self-ban and the cocaine vaccine if they are not to allow policies that 
“rule out alternatives.”   
A similar example in the literature on paternalism is of Ulysses and the Sirens in 
which Ulysses ties himself to the mast to prevent himself from being lured by the songs 
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of the Sirens.  In the case of Ulysses, gambling self-bans, and self-elected cocaine 
vaccines, we should want to say that the free choices to rule out potentially harmful 
alternatives are justified yet Sunstein and Thaler’s criterion is inadequate in these 
scenarios because it is too strong.  There may be even more reasons to believe that having 
more choices at our disposal may not necessarily lead to the maximization of wellbeing 
and may not be as all-important as Thaler and Sunstein assume.  In fact, there is evidence 
pointing towards the view that we have a better chance of increasing wellbeing “from 
some limited scheme of constraints or burdens on choice to help us avoid common 
mistakes” (Haybron, 2007) than from having unlimited choices.      
The situation where universal vaccination is implemented on a national level, as 
in the third example outlined above, also presents a challenge to Thaler and Sunstein’s 
criteria.  Again, the central question is whether the cocaine vaccine violates the nudge 
criteria for infringement on freedom which is that policies must not rule out alternatives 
or make them more costly.  It could be argued that while the universal cocaine vaccine 
rules out one alternative (i.e. using cocaine) it actually increases other choices available 
to those who would otherwise have been impeded by drug use.  New choices available to 
those newly reformed as drug-immune include more options for spending discretionary 
money, more ways to spend recreational time, the ability to hold down a job, staying out 
of jail, among many others.   And, the universal cocaine vaccine does not make choices 
more costly because we could assume it would not impose any prohibitive costs beyond 
what is already incurred via the same administering process with other standard 
childhood vaccinations.  Furthermore, the universal vaccine, like other childhood 
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vaccinations, would be highly encouraged yet not mandated; you maintain the option to 
opt-out. 
So, does the universal vaccine pass Thaler and Sunstein’s stipulated criteria for a 
nudge or is it too intrusive?  Are crucial autonomy considerations being violated?  On the 
face of it, many people might consider the idea of a universal cocaine vaccine to be an 
appalling violation of self-direction and the ability to live one’s life according to the way 
one chooses despite the increased choices available to those who live drug-free.  But, the 
objective itself does seem to hold the utmost respect for individuals in providing the 
opportunity to live addiction-free.  On Thaler and Sunstein’s view, the cocaine vaccine 
would not be allowed technically because, if chosen, it rules out an alternative, albeit 
non-mandated.  But, let’s reconsider whether the cocaine vaccine is actually a violation 
of autonomy because an important criterion has yet to be mentioned.  In this case, one 
way to determine whether the cocaine vaccine is objectionable is to use an autonomy-
based criterion and ask “if the people in question would consent to the interference if they 
were fully rational” (Scoccia, 1990) especially considering the fact that the vaccine 
would be administered during childhood and not to fully competent adults.  Even if 
people irrationally believe that the vaccine represented an infringement on their self-
direction, implementing the cocaine vaccine might be justified because they would 
consent if they were “fully rational and well informed” (Scoccia, 1990) about it.  Surely, 
careful and rational contemplation concludes that living a life drug-free is more 
conducive to enhancing wellbeing than not.  Granted that there may be some fully 
informed individuals who still choose to use cocaine occasionally or recreationally, the 
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main force of this criterion is to show that the vast majority of fully informed individuals 
would not choose to use cocaine given the high risks of addiction among other things. 
This is enough to show that Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria for a nudge are inadequate 
because their reason for rejecting the universal cocaine vaccine (i.e. rules out alternatives) 
is not the right one.  It is my view that Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria should instead be 
supplemented by reasons that represent autonomy considerations because the reasons 
they provide for the instances of self-election and the universal cocaine vaccine are either 
conflicting or mistaken in their aims. 
Additional Condition for Evaluating Justifiable Nudges 
As stated above, the central debate surrounding libertarian paternalism hinges on 
concerns about when limitations on autonomy are justified for the sake of beneficence.  
In other words, we need to find the right balance between libertarian elements, which 
guard against coercion, and paternalism elements, which promote welfare.  As Thaler and 
Sunstein’s view on libertarian paternalism policies stands, it is inadequate because their 
criteria do not appropriately deal with the test cases of subliminal messages and cocaine 
vaccines.  My view is that there is a middle option between the opposing elements, as 
Thaler and Sunstein also desire, but that it includes something else beyond what they 
stipulate to handle the aforementioned test cases.  It is based on a balancing view which 
puts forth the commonsense notion that there need not be an overarching commitment to 
autonomy or beneficence in all cases whenever there is conflict.  These values must be 
weighed on a case-by-case basis.   
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 My view is that a legitimate nudge needs to pass evaluation of an additional 
condition beyond what is included in Thaler and Sunstein’s proposal.  Evaluating nudges 
involves weighing the opposing considerations of beneficence and autonomy and, 
depending on the situation, in some cases beneficence trumps autonomy while in other 
cases autonomy trumps beneficence.  Many standard nudges, such as the cafeteria 
director scenario or the presumed consent organ donation scenario, are examples of when 
beneficence trumps autonomy and justifiably so.  But, even though they meet the criteria 
put forth by Thaler and Sunstein, the subliminal messages nudges are unjustifiably 
allowed and the cocaine vaccine nudge are unjustifiably disallowed.  This shows that 
their criteria are inadequate and are in need of an additional condition.   The condition is 
that autonomy trumps beneficence to reject policies if three crucial autonomy 
considerations, described below, are violated.  If crucial autonomy considerations are 
violated, this should serve as reason to deem a policy unjustified and unadoptable.  The 
purpose of giving autonomy considerations special status is that caution should be 
exercised when evaluating autonomy considerations in order to avoid acceptance of a 
policy that turns out to be undesirable.  Before describing the autonomy considerations, I 
will briefly review beneficence considerations.  
Beneficence considerations 
In most nudge cases, beneficence trumps autonomy in favor of acceptance of a 
proposal if beneficence criteria are overwhelming present along with only minor 
restrictions of autonomy.  In the standard cases discussed in Thaler & Sunstein’s book, 
some of the resulting specific beneficence considerations are that long-term happiness is 
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maximized, benefits accrue to individuals that are least sophisticated, and so on.  If these 
improvements in wellbeing are the outcome of implementing nudge policies at the 
expense of only a minor violation in autonomy, such as a slight curtailment of self-
direction (as in the cases of the cafeteria director example or presumed consent organ 
donation), then they are justified.  To consider another example, body scanning machines 
at airports or other federal buildings are justified because they provide significant welfare 
benefits in the sense that they achieve more benefits than harm.  They do so at the 
expense of only a slight violation of autonomy in terms of respect for privacy.  However, 
it would be a mistake to think that there are not cases in which autonomy trumps 
beneficence.   
Autonomy considerations 
Autonomy is a notion that has many different meanings and applications.  An 
overarching definition is that being autonomous is “to be directed by considerations, 
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, 
but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self” (Christman, 2009).  
Beyond this definition, though, there is much more complexity and little agreement 
among philosophers about choosing the specific conditions of autonomy.  While 
autonomy is not a simple concept, there is a common assumption which is that autonomy 
captures a person’s ability “to act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are 
somehow [his or] her own” (Christman, 2009).  The three autonomy criteria I selected as 
necessary for nudge evaluation are chosen with that common standard in mind.  While 
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my criteria draw upon different theories of autonomy, they are all needed to account for 
the great diversity of “nudgeable” applications. 
Autonomy may trump beneficence in favor of rejection of a policy if crucial 
autonomy considerations are violated.  The key issue is to delineate exactly which 
considerations to include in the criteria.  Thaler and Sunstein define the libertarian 
element, or the autonomy considerations, as consisting of the following.  First, nudges 
should not rule out alternatives.  Second, nudges should not be costly.  In order to rule out 
potentially coercive policies and allow the beneficial ones, I contend that at least the 
following three crucial autonomy considerations should be added.  First, nudges should 
not curtail self-direction in a major way.  As in the case of subliminal messages, self-
direction is curtailed in a major way when the ability to refuse intervention is unavailable.  
Self-direction, or self-determination, is one main component of an autonomous life and 
should be upheld to a certain extent.  Some limitation in self-direction is justified, as in 
the cafeteria director example, where certain food options are presented to you in a way 
that makes it more burdensome to choose want you really want- triple fudge brownies for 
lunch.  However, it is not extremely difficult to overcome your desire if all that is 
required is looking past the steamed vegetables or eating at a different location.  Self-
direction, in the cafeteria director example, is still preserved and the intervention is 
justified.  In the subliminal message cases, as well as others that can be imagined, the 
major infringement on autonomy is that we are severely captive to opposition to our self-
direction. 
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Second, nudges should show respect for individuals, understood as protecting 
negative constraints owed individuals to not severely “interfere with efforts to make 
decisions and govern their own conduct” (Dillon, 2010).  This is one understanding of 
respect out of a few of the contending standard interpretations of respect in the current 
literature. As in the case of subliminal messages, individuals are not adequately informed 
about the reasons they are making their choices unlike when an opt-out program for 
organ donation is adopted, for instance.  With opt-out organ donation, individuals can 
inform themselves about the benefits of complying and still make a choice to decline.  
Their rational faculties can play a role in their decision-making.  In contrast, with 
subliminal messages people do not actively and expressly have the option to consider 
alternatives and employ rational faculties to independently form a preference.   
Third, nudges are justified if and only if the person would consent if they were 
fully rational and well-informed (Railton, 1986).  This general conception of autonomy is 
motivated because people often make choices that are counterproductive to wellbeing if 
left to their own devices with insufficient information at their disposal.  Given this 
tendency, people could benefit from interventions that lead them to the choices they 
would make if they were more rational and better informed about what will actually 
increase their wellbeing. This preserves the element for individuals to be able to self-
select their desires with a guarantee that interventions would not go beyond what they 
themselves would do with full information if they had it.  As we know from the findings 
in behavioral economics, people do face limitations on making rational choices and it 
makes sense to consider what decisions and nudges people would be open to if they were 
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fully rational.  In both the self-elected and universal cocaine vaccine, people who are 
fully rational and well-informed would choose to allow the self-elected cocaine vaccine 
because of the beneficence considerations under full information.  Conversely, 
individuals who irrationally believe that the Save More Tomorrow program is worthless 
would surely consent to enrollment in it if they were fully rational and well-informed and 
thus offering it is justified. 
I have provided three specific autonomy considerations by which to judge nudge 
policies in addition to the elements provided by Thaler and Sunstein.  Adding these 
additional autonomy considerations to Thaler and Sunstein’s standard criteria for a nudge 
will overcome the problematic cases of the subliminal message and the cocaine vaccine.  
Subliminal messages infringe on autonomy by curtailing self-direction and by not 
showing enough respect for people.  Despite contrary intuitions, the cocaine vaccine does 
not infringe on crucial autonomy considerations because it does not curtail self-direction, 
disrespect people, or violate what people would do if they were fully rational and well-
informed.  These considerations provide a reasonable list with which to check each 
proposal on a case-by-base basis.  My additional autonomy condition signals how to 
properly balance autonomy and beneficence and when to reject nudge policies.  It is 
preferable to the less specific criteria put forth by Thaler and Sunstein because it is 
thorough enough to appropriately deal with problematic cases.   
Objections  
 In this section, I will confront the main three objections to my view along with 
responses to each.  The first objection to my view charges that it is too complex.  Thaler 
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and Sunstein’s theory have fewer and simpler criterions to apply.  No doubt, such an 
original and ingenious theory as theirs is surely to be commended for being so 
straightforward and uncomplicated; however, it falls short in its ability to deal with 
complex cases.  I respond to this objection by pointing out that Thaler and Sunstein’s 
criteria can be both too strong and also not strong enough in terms of protecting 
autonomy considerations.  So, while Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria are clever, that they 
are not quite detailed enough to navigate the variety of real-world scenarios and are in 
need of additional considerations to become complete.  This brings about another related 
concern about my view which charges that my additional considerations are too 
ambiguous.  Particularly, it can be difficult, for example, to determine exactly what “fully 
rational and well informed” people might do in specific situations considering that there 
might not be agreement about the facts or values in question.  I respond that a small 
amount of ambiguity necessarily comes with the territory of adding considerations.  And, 
despite the fact there may not be a convergence of opinions on the facts or values in 
question, imagining what most people would do under the assumption of full information 
is still a helpful and useful indicator for whether nudges are justified are not.   So, even 
though it will be hard to judge, adding considerations is something that must be done 
given the inadequacies of Thaler and Sunstein’s criteria that become obvious upon 
inspection of problematic test cases.   
The second objection to my view is the concern about exactly how to balance 
autonomy and beneficence in each case.  A challenge with employing my additional 
condition for new cases is determining when autonomy should trump beneficence rather 
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than the other way around.  On the balancing view, it can be difficult to find the 
“appropriate balance between these two potential mistakes” of infringing autonomy 
versus neglecting welfare promotion (Brock, 1988).  There is certainly cause for concern 
about “erring too far in either direction” on these conflicting aims (Brock, 1988).  
Admittedly, there is no easy rule to determine the appropriate place to delineate the 
conflicting aims on the balancing view; however, my response is that I have provided 
three distinct considerations that will help identify when autonomy has been violated in a 
major way.  For the purpose of policy implementation, these considerations show us at 
what point proposals ought to be rejected and become autonomy trumping.  Nudges 
should pass all three criteria and even if one autonomy criterion is violated, then a nudge 
is under-justified.  The ambiguity stems from the fact that all three criteria may not be 
applicable for every case and that all three criteria may not produce a definite verdict one 
way or the other.  Even still, there should be sufficient autonomy considerations to 
ultimately pass judgment on the nudge in question. 
The third objection comes from the behavioral economics standpoint and argues 
that my view is too liberal.  The evidence from behavioral economics confronts classic 
liberal conceptions of autonomy because it suggests people don’t function in their own 
best interest when in freedom-rich environments.  Basically, we stand to benefit from 
helpful interventions more than we previously thought.  I accept the findings from 
behavioral economics as well founded but I respond to this objection by stating that my 
view offers the right mix of liberalism and beneficence.  “The liberal ideal of option 
freedom involves unbounded and unburdened choice and self-determination” (Haybron, 
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2007) but that is far from what I am arguing for which is autonomy checks on beneficent 
policies.  So, I am only for a narrow view of self-determination which concerns “basic 
liberties, rights to noninterference, democratic participation” and the like- not a broad 
view of it which concerns freedom “in the sense of having a wide range of options” 
(Haybron, 2007).  So, I think my reliance on adding considerations of autonomy are 
warranted because they still allow helpful beneficence. 
Post-evaluation 
I propose that nudge policies should be held to standards that are practical enough 
to be applied in the real world.  One final thought that is relevant to the evaluation nudges 
is the implementation of post-evaluation process.  A nudge policy must include review 
after implementation to determine whether it was successful at achieving its purported 
aim.  As with other considerations, this too must be chosen depending on the 
circumstances and the policy in deliberation.  Thaler and Sunstein do not provide a 
description of how a nudge might be evaluated after the fact to ensure that 
implementation is carried out as intended.  Policy implementation in reality is often 
heavily weighed down by bureaucracy and sometimes by concealment.  Although they do 
not address it in their writings, I believe that they would agree with the practical need for 
a system of checks and balances that serves the function of a “nudge oversight 
committee.”  To reiterate, avoidance and extra protection from implementation of bad 
policies that infringe on autonomy is the reason for precaution and oversight.       
Conclusion 
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The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate libertarian paternalism.  First, the 
concept of paternalism, the different types of paternalism, as well as the central concepts 
of autonomy and beneficence were explained in detail.   Second, the rationality findings 
from behavioral economics related to libertarian paternalism were summarized.  Third, 
the general objections to libertarian paternalism were discussed.  Fourth, the specific case 
problems of subliminal messages and the cocaine vaccine were described in detail.  Next, 
I presented the conditions which must be evaluated in order for a nudge to be justified 
which overcome the specific problems facing libertarian paternalism. 
The debate surrounding nudges can be summarized in terms of respect.  Acts of 
beneficence are a display of respect for others while autonomy is preservation of self-
respect.  In order to justify nudges, a proper balance between respect for others and self-
respect must be negotiated.  To use an analogy, nudges consist of domino-effects where 
the first domino to fall is preservation of self-respect and the subsequent domino to fall is 
respect for others.  Showing respect for others by improving the wellbeing of people with 
bounded rationality should not come at the expense of self-respect but rather after it or 
with it.  We have negative obligations to not interfere with other’s efforts “to make their 
own decisions and govern their own conduct” (Dillon, 2010) and then positive 
obligations “to protect them from their own self-harming decisions” (Dillon, 2010).  The 
criteria that Thaler and Sunstein provide as the justification for nudges are inadequate.  In 
this thesis, I have attempted to add an additional condition based on autonomy that 
effectively deals with problematic test cases.  Ideally, nudges should accomplish both 
goals of preserving self-respect while maintaining respect for others.   
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